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Edlund and Korn [2002] (EK) proposed that prostitutes are well
paid and that the wage premium reflects foregone marriage market
opportunities. However, studies of street prostitution in the U.S. have
revealed only modest wages and considerable risks of disease and vi-
olence, casting doubt on EK’s premise of an unexplained wage pre-
mium. In this paper, we present evidence from high-end prostitution,
the so called escort market, a market that is, if not entirely safe, no-
tably safer than street prostitution. Analyzing wage information on
more than 40,000 escorts in the U.S. and Canada collected from a
web site, we find strong support for EK. First, escorts in the sample
earn high wages, on average $280/hour. Second, while looks decline
monotonically with age, wages follow a hump-shaped pattern, with a
peak in the 26-30 age bracket, which coincides with the most inten-
sive marriage ages for women in the U.S. Third, the age-wage profile is
significantly flatter, and prices are lower (5%), despite slightly better
escort characteristics, in cities that rank high in terms of conferences,
suggesting that servicing men in transit is associated with less stigma.
Fourth, this hump in the age-wage profile is absent among escorts for
whom the marriage market penalty is lower or absent: escorts who do
not provide sex and transsexuals.
JEL: J12, J31, J49
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1 Introduction
Eliot Spitzer’s recent involvement with an escort cost him not only the gov-
ernorship, but also some $1,000 an hour.1 The Spitzer scandal offers a rare
view of the high end of the prostitution market and showcases a glaring pe-
culiarity: price. Prostitution is a competitive market – minimal skills are
required, services are standardized, and barriers to entry and exit are non-
existent – all of which imply that prices should be dictated by the cost of
supply. While the woman involved in the Spitzer scandal seemed attractive
enough, neither her looks nor her resume would likely land her a similarly
well-paying regular job. Thus, opportunity cost of time can hardly account
∗We thank Tore Ellingsen, Dan Hamermesh, Evelyn Korn, Asa Rosen and Jeff Sears
for helpful discussions. Special thanks to respondents to our survey.
†Department of Economics, Columbia University.
‡Kenan Flagler School of Business, UNC Chapel Hill.
§Kenan Flagler School of Business, UNC Chapel Hill.
1http://abcnews.go.com/m/screen?id=6302149&pid=359
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for her price. Risk of arrest or disease also cannot explain the peculiarity
since the rates charged by such high-end prostitutes are nearly ten times
that of street-level prostitutes who face greater risk.
In a recent paper, Edlund and Korn [2002], henceforth EK, claimed that
prostitutes are well paid because of forgone marriage opportunities. How-
ever, both the claim of high earnings and the proposed explanation have
been criticized. There is little systematic data on wages or earnings of pros-
titutes. The most eye-popping numbers have been reported from developing
countries where demand is in large part driven by the presence of transitory
men from high income countries (for South East Asia, see Lim [1998]). For
the United States, in contrast, where demand is mainly home-grown, stud-
ies of street prostitution reveal only modest earnings [Lillard et al., 1995,
Levitt and Venkatesh, 2007]. Considering the fact that street prostitutes
face non-negligible risks, notably arrests, STDs and violence [Potterat et al.,
2004], earnings do not appear high. As for damage to marriage market value,
the fact that some prostitutes marry has been taken as evidence against EK
[Arunachalam and Shah, 2008].2 Moreover, EK’s focus on the marriage mar-
ket as an opportunity cost of prostitution for women has been criticized as
sexist and inferior to a gender neutral, stigma-based, explanation [Giusta
et al., 2009].3
2This literal interpretation of EK’s simplifying assumption of the prostitution/wife as
a dichotomous choice (rather than as a discount on marriage market value) also ignores
the possibility of inframarginal suppliers with lower opportunity cost than the marginal
supplier.
3EK’s explanation is not incompatible with stigma. In fact, EK provides a rationale
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In this paper we raise our focus from the rough-and-tumble of street
prostitution to the world of escorts. The U.S. escort market present several
advantages for testing EK’s hypothesis. First, escorts are less exposed to per-
sonal violence, disease, or arrest than are their street prostitute counterparts.
This is due to a variety of factors: clients of escorts are wealthier, agencies
often screen and/or protect escorts during encounters, condom use is com-
mon, and, because escorts typically contract only for “companionship,” they
are less subject to regulation and legal prosecution, e.g., Biggs [1988]. Sec-
ond, since the bottom has essentially fallen out of the under-class marriage
market in the U.S., e.g., Wilson [1987], we would not expect lost marriage
opportunities to be driving prostitution prices at the low end. Escorts, on
the other hand, could face substantial opportunity cost in the marriage mar-
ket, having considerably better socio-economic characteristics. Third, prices
are not driven by foreign sex-tourism, that is, men (and women a priori)
are present in both the marriage and the commercial sex market. Fourth,
solicitation is internet based, which reduces risk and transaction costs – and,
importantly, provides the source of our data. Using a webcrawl program,
we have downloaded reviews and price information on some 40,000 (mainly)
US-based escorts.
The data are strongly supportive of EK. First, wages are high. On aver-
age, escorts who provide sex command some $280/hour, a wage rate that on
a full time basis would place them in the top 0.5 percentile of the US earnings
for why prostitutes would be stigmatized, female prostitutes in particular.
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distribution, or roughly in the top 0.05 percentile of the female earnings dis-
tribution [Kopczuk et al., 2008, table 12B]. Most likely, escorts do not work
2,000 hours per year, but a mere 20% employment would suffice to secure
a position in the top quintile of the U.S. household income distribution (an
income roughly at par with that of the median household whose head holds
a Master’s degree).4
Second, if, as hypothesized by EK, an escort’s wage compensates her for
lost marriage opportunities, then we would expect wages for female escorts to
be highest when the marriage market is the thickest. Marriages are heavily
concentrated in the mid-to late 20s. Median age at first marriage for women
was 25.1 in 2000-2003,5 and about two thirds of women have married by age
30 [Bramlett and Mosher, 2002].
Unconditionally, the pattern in our data is clear: wages show a clear
hump-shaped pattern, peaking in the late 20s. Average hourly wages for
escorts aged 18-20 providing sex to their clients are about $260, increasing to
$280 for women 21-25, topping out above $298 between ages 26-30, declining
slightly to $295 from 31-35, dropping further to $276 until age 40, and settling
to $255 afterward (Table 1, also Figure 1, top panel). However, these un-
conditional results ignore potential differences in appearance, performance,
and services offered that vary across age. When we add an extensive battery
4U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2003, tables 688 and
689, 2001 year and dollars.
5U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2002-2003, Census Supplementary
Survey 2000-2001.
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of control variables for specific acts, physical characteristics, ethnicity, and
city fixed effects, the relation remains. Escorts in their prime-marriage years
demand the highest compensation from their clients. The premium from age
18-20 till the peak near age 30 is roughly 7%, or $18 per encounter. If an
escort works 15 nights a month and sees 3 clients a night, this represents a
premium of almost $10,000 annually.
Third, this hump-shape is absent among subsets of escorts for whom
marriage market damage would be less important: escorts who do not provide
sex and transsexuals.
Fourth, EK predicts that the wage premium charged by prostitutes should
be positively related to the ability of their potential husbands to decipher
their current or past occupation as sex workers. We rank U.S. cities accord-
ing to the Travel Industry Association of America (TIA) and the National
Business Travel Association (NBTA) list of popular conference/convention
cities with the idea that conference/convention participants make for a more
transient customer base. We find that the premium charged by escorts in
their late 20s is reduced in cities that host multiple conferences – cities such
as Dallas (1.5%) and Orlando (-4%). In contrast, escorts in cities home
to comparatively fewer conferences such as Minneapolis (4.5%) or Houston
(4.7%), charge higher premia during their prime marrying years.
Our results contribute to a growing body of literature in economics on
the features of the prostitute market. Cunningham and Kendall [2009a]
provide descriptive information on escort prices obtained from the internet.
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Moffatt and Peters [2004] also obtained their data from the internet, and
while they found a hump-shaped age-wage profile (with a peak at age 21),
they emphasized the labor market as the opportunity cost. Another small
empirical literature has focussed on condom use and associated willingness
to pay (to avoid), e.g., Rao et al. [2003], Gertler et al. [2005], Robinson and
Yeh [2009].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
develop predictions for the age-wage profile if opportunity costs are driven
by foregone marriage market opportunities. Section 3 describes how the data
were collected and coded. Section 4 presents our results, where our focus is
on the age-wage profile for various subsets of our data. We also present the
results from a short email survey that we sent to email addresses culled from
the web where we ask about compatibility with marriage and dating, and
condom use, Section 4.2. Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary and
discussion.
2 Hypothesis Development
EK focused on the level of earnings in prostitution. Their main insight is that
unlike other professions, prostitution substantially reduces a woman’s value
on the marriage market. The associated “stigma” increases the marginal
cost of selling sex commercially, and sustains high earnings. Our empirical
work is motivated by applying the same reasoning within the population
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of active escorts. That is, provided demand exists, we expect escorts with
higher costs – particularly those related to marriage opportunities – to charge
higher prices.
Trivially, this will be true if the market for escorting services is perfectly
competitive, in which prices and marginal costs move one-to-one. We do not
observe aggregate (or even city-level) demand, but several factors argue for
a market that is fairly competitive, at least locally. By this, we mean that
although clients may exhibit preferences for age, race, hair color, or other fea-
tures, the cost of switching providers is, we think, very low (if not negative, as
demand for variety would predict). To anticipate events, our data (described
in Section 3) contains evidence of both. In Figure A.1, lower panel, we see
that reviewers of older (younger) escorts are more likely to subsequently re-
view an older (younger) escort, indicating at least some preference for age.
Undoubtedly, the same picture would emerge were we to stratify the data
on race, body shape, and a number of other characteristics. However, male
clients have a strong preference for variety in terms of providers, Figure A.1,
lower panel. About 60% of reviewers in our sample reviewed multiple escorts
(accounting for 90% of reviews).
Such evidence suggests high degree of substitutability between escorts,
reducing market power. Furthermore, minimal skills are required, services
are standardized, and barriers to entry and exit are non-existent.6 Together,
6The explosion of online escorting has reduced whatever entry barriers, however small,
may have previously existed.
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these factors suggest that within any escort market – e.g., early 20s, White,
brunette, thin, located in Philadelphia – the equilibrium price will likely be
close to the (marginal) escort’s reservation wage.7 Furthermore, and impor-
tantly, it suggests that the higher price observed for the 26-30 age group is
driven by this demographic’s facing higher opportunity cost of escorting. In
case the supply curve is horizontal, this would follow trivially since the equi-
librium price is independent of demand. With upward sloping supply (and
thus infra-marginal suppliers), demand also plays a role for price. However,
making only weak assumptions about demand – not being higher for older
escorts – a demand driven explanation would be hard pressed to account for
a hump-shaped age-wage profile. Thus, if (as we find) price is higher for
an older age group, this is highly suggestive of this age group facing higher
opportunity cost than younger escorts.
Our main proxy for marriage-related marginal cost is the escort’s age.
Intuitively, the dynamics of searching for husband change over a woman’s life
(whether she is an escort or not). We wish to identify the most “expensive”
years for a woman ultimately wishing to marry. In other words, during which
years in a woman’s life would she require the highest premium to neither date
nor maintain relationships that would lead to marriage?
In the U.S., rates of first marriage are highest in the 20s. Marriage rates
7Nonetheless, we do not claim that the escort market is characterized strictly by perfect
competition. Monopolistic competition with differentiated goods is likely a more realistic
description, but, we maintain, one in with low switching costs and consequently, little
market power for any one escort.
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rise through the late teens, are constant through the 20s, slow significantly
in the 30s, and beyond age 45, first marriages are smaller. As for fertility,
rates are the highest for the 26-30 age group[Sutton and Mathews, 2004,
figure 3].8 If the willingness to pay for marriage derives from male demand
for children (through marriage, men obtain legal fatherhood – paternity and
legal custody), then these high fertility years are likely the most valuable.
Intuitively, earlier marriages face a higher risk of dissolution before the arrival
of children, and later marriages face increasing risk of childlessness.
From this evidence, it seems quite clear that convincing a female to sit
out the marriage market in her late 20s or early 30s would be particularly
difficult. A woman’s earlier years (e.g., around 20) are comparatively cheap,
as she still possesses well over a decade of fertility, and can even afford a failed
marriage before her capacity to bear children declines. Similarly, by the late
30s, the window for childbearing has (generally) past, implying a negligible
opportunity cost on the marriage market. Such humped-shape marginal costs
are consistent with marriage-driven outside opportunities, but are difficult
to justify through the usual channels (e.g., returns to experience, etc.).
The Appendix outlines a simple theoretical search framework that would
8By necessity, evidence on female fecundity draws upon fertility studies. The demogra-
phy and medical literature documents that female fertility begins to rapidly decline around
age 30, e.g., American Society for Reproductive Medicine Practise Committee [2008]. For
example, Schwartz and Mayaux [1982] examined the fertility of American wives of sterile
men by quantifying how many artificial insemination attempts are required for successful
conception. Prior to age 31, the probability of success of artificial insemination after 12
cycles was relatively stable at near 73%. A steep decline begins after 5, where it drops to
61%, settling to 54% after age 35. Natural population data are nearly unanimous that for
practical purposes, the potential for childbearing ends near age 42.
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deliver the same result.
3 Data
The main source of our data is a website where the clients of escorts re-
view their experience. The reviews include precise detail including price,
services performed and characteristics of the escort. The reviews have two
components: (1) a textual review which details the experience and (2) a
standardized form in which the reviewers are made to assign values and
pre-specified descriptions. In each review clients are asked to assign a score
(1-10) which rates the escort’s appearance and a score (1-10) which rates
the escort’s performance. They are also asked to describe the escort’s age,
ethnicity, timeliness, hair color and style, breast appearance, height, photo
shown before the encounter, tattoos, piercings, sexual acts performed, among
a number of other dimensions. For each of these categories, users are asked
to choose among a pre-specified list of options (via a drop-down menu). For
example, when describing the escort’s age, users can choose among 18-20,
21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45 and over 45. For each escort, the web-
site displays a profile which presents these characteristics, the price(s) and
description of the escort’s service(s) and hypertext links to the history of
reviews for the escort. These links provide both the numerical score for ap-
pearance and performance in each review as well as the textual description
of each review.
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During the period starting December 12th and ending December 17th,
2008, we employ a web-crawling program which systematically downloads
the profile, pricing data and the numerical scores in each historical review.
For each price, the client provides a time length which is sometimes not
standardized. We read through the 1000+ unique time descriptions (e.g.,
“90 min,” “about an hour,” “30-40 minutes,” etc.) and when necessary,
convert each to a time in hours. For some descriptions we assign a missing
value if we cannot determine the length or we determine the given length is
not objective (e.g., “2 seconds – ripoff”). The result is a data set where for
each escort we observe hourly wage together with personal and performance
characteristics.
We then apply a set of filters to our data. First, to avoid stale reviews we
only consider reviews given in the last 5 years. The years 2004-2008 account
for 75.8% of all reviews. Second, we restrict ourselves to encounters that are
between one and four hours. An hour is the standard time allotted for an ap-
pointment, comprising over 80% of our total observations. Meetings that last
longer than four hours are very rare (less than 1%) and often involve travel
and other factors that make comparison with regular engagements more diffi-
cult. Similarly, very short encounters are disproportionately associated with
scams or rip-offs, during which little to no service is rendered despite pay-
ment by the client. We exclude such observations, and also those reviews
where the client’s numerical score assigned to performance is 1, 2 or 3, or
if the escort is labeled as a “ripoff” on her profile page. Nonetheless, such
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unusual observations are so few that none of our main results are affected by
their inclusion.
One of the more important filters is whether or not an escort is inferred to
provide sex to his or her clients. In one of the drop-down menus available to
reviewers, clients can report what specific services were provided during the
encounter. In approximately 85% of our observations, sex is indicated. In
the balance, escorts do not provide sex (of any kind), but may offer services
such as a “sensual massage.”
4 Results
We start by presenting a number of summary statistics for the main sam-
ple of female escorts that provide sex to their clients, Table 1. This list is
representative of the types of variables reported on the reviewing website,
but is not exhaustive. In particularly, we exclude summary information on
the most explicit variables, but later include them as controls in our wage
regressions. From left to right, Table 1 displays a number of interesting pat-
terns. The first variable is the escort’s appearance, averaged over all clients
that provide a review for him or her. As expected, average beauty strictly
declines with age. Such a pattern suggests that appearance reviews are at
least somewhat objective.9
9If reviewers were able to adjust each escort’s beauty evaluation by her age (as they were
instructed to in Daniel S. Hamermesh and Jeffrey Biddle’s (1994) study on beauty and
labor market outcomes), the declining pattern we observe would be absent. Unpublished
personal communication with Daniel Hamermesh regarding their data confirms ratings of
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The appearance of the youngest escort cohort (18-20) is rated 7.68 (out
of a possible 10) on average, decreasing only slightly to 7.62 during during
the early twenties.10 Appearance then starts to decline at an increasing rate,
falling to 7.51 between ages 26-30, and then to 7.32 for ages 31-35.11 Es-
corts over age 40 are judged to be substantially less attractive than the their
youngest counterparts, by almost one unit on a 10-point scale (p=0.000).12
Similar patterns emerge when examining particular physical characteristics.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the “performance” of each escort is rated higher in
each successive age group, except for the group aged 40 and above. Com-
pared to those of the youngest cohort, the performances of escorts in their
30s rate roughly 3 tenths of a point higher on the 10-point scale (p=0.000).
This pattern can be reconciled with selection effects over time (i.e., the best
performers are most likely to remain in the profession), learning through
experience, or older escorts compensating for declining appearance through
increased effort. That escorts above age 36 “Kiss” their clients some 57%
of the time compared to 39% for those below age 20 is indicative of such
beauty for both males and females declines with age.
10The ordinal options are: 1 - I was really scared; 2 ugly; 3 homely; 4 ok if you are
drunk; 5 plain; 6 nice; 7 attractive; 8 really hot; 9 model material; 10 once in a
lifetime.
11The drop in appearance may not seem large but note that sample size roughly halves
between each five year age bracket. A 35 year old who is still in the escort business is
there probably because, among other things, she ages well.
12A similar decline is observed when examining the percentiles within each age group.
Extremely attractive escorts (rated as 9 or higher) are more likely to be observed in the
youngest age groups, whereas the most plain (rated as 5 or below) are most common
among the oldest escorts. The second effect is slightly more pronounced than the first,
leading to higher dispersion in appearance as the age of the cohort increases.
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substitution, and is confirmed (unreported) in a number of other more in-
timate dimensions. Similarly, older escorts are more likely to be punctual
(“On Time”), and when they do arrive, offer a “No Rush” session to their
clients.
However, the pattern with which we are most concerned is the hourly
wage by age group. Perhaps contrary to intuition, Table 1 indicates that
the youngest escorts, who are rated as the most attractive on average,13 do
not command the highest wages. Escorts under the age of 21 charge slightly
less than $260 on average, roughly 7% less than the cohort directly older.
The highest wages are earned by escorts between 26-30, who average almost
$300. After that, wages fall off with age. This hump-shaped pattern accords
well (qualitatively) with the pattern for marriage and fertility in the U.S.
described earlier (Section 2).
4.1 Wage Regressions
The hump-shaped pattern remains when we regress the logarithm of hourly
wages on a progressively larger set of covariates. Table 2 shows the results. In
the first column that includes only age dummies, the same hump-shaped pat-
tern emerges. The youngest cohort (18-20) is omitted from the specification.
Hourly wages increase for the next two groups (21-25 and 26-30 respectively),
then slightly decrease between ages 31 and 35, and fall substantially there-
13Women in their late teens, post puberty, but before bearing their first child, have
the highest prospective reproductive value, which may be one reason this age group is
consistently considered the most attractive by men [Buss, 1994].
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after. All differences between successive age groups (e.g., between age 18-20
and 21-25, between 21-25 and 26-30, etc.) are significantly different at the
two percent significance level. From peak to trough, the wage premium is
between 10% and 15%, when compared to the youngest and oldest escorts
respectively.
However, as the summary statistics make clear, escort age is highly cor-
related with a number of factors expected to influence wages, particularly
appearance and performance. The second column shows that when these
controls are added, the explanatory power of the regression increases sub-
stantially from under one to over 18 percent, but the hump shaped wage
profile remains. The third column includes city dummies, which picks up
cross-sectional differences in local client income, demographic composition,
or other factors that may influence the wage. As seen, a premium of approx-
imately 10% is observed, even with these controls.
In the fourth column, we include a large family of “attribute” controls,
including hair color and length, body type (e.g., “heavy”), breast size, the
presence of tattoos, piercings, and a number of more explicit descriptions (not
all coefficients are presented in Table 2). As seen, this family of attributes
increases the R2 by another 9%. Furthermore, including this set of controls
somewhat attenuates the wage pattern observed in the first three columns,
reducing the premium for 26-30 year-old escorts from 9% to 7%. In column
five, we include the full set of controls, adding “activity” fixed effects for a
number of explicit sexual services rendered. Taking this column as the most
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informative estimate, we see almost a perfectly symmetric hump shaped wage
profile, peaking at nearly 7% in the 26-30 age bracket.
Approximately half of the sample are represented by escort agencies. One
concern is that within a given agency, it is common for the hourly rate to be
identical across escorts, regardless of appearance, performance, age, or other
factors. Although escorts may select (or be screened) into agencies based on
such criteria, wage compression within any given agency reduces the data’s
variability. Additionally, we do not have systematic data on the split in
revenues between agencies and escorts, nor whether such splits differ across
age profiles. To eliminate such concerns, the final column shows the results
of the full estimation (with all controls) for the sub-sample of escorts who
do not work with agencies. Escorts in this “independent” sample are slightly
older on average, although all age groups are still well represented. As seen,
most of the coefficients between columns five and six are similar, although
the hump-shaped profile becomes even more apparent. In the subsequent
analysis, we show the results when all observations are aggregated, but note
here that all results are strongest for this independent set.
While the peculiar pattern of wages coinciding with the median age of
first marriage is consistent with EK, it is difficult to reconcile with other
alternative explanations. An upward pattern would be consistent with in-
creasingly valuable outside opportunities, reflecting returns to experience or
training that accrue over time. Similarly, an upward sloping wage profile
could be justified by returns to escort-specific skills or experience, increased
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pricing power as the number of competitors diminishes, or the ability of sea-
soned escorts to extract rents from repeat clients. On the other hand, a
downward slope might be expected, particularly if appearance is the primary
determinant of price, and if, despite the detail the data afford, we have not
adequately controlled for looks in our regressions.14
4.1.1 Falsification
To check for mis-specification, we consider the wage profiles of two control
samples: transsexuals (born male) and female (born) escorts who do not
provide sex to their clients. Transsexuals provide a convenient comparison:
while their jobs as escorts are very similar, their marriage prospects are not.
According to the logic underpinning EK, if they married as husbands, they
would be on the paying side, and if their gender role was that of the wife,
they are clearly barren and therefore the basis for compensation would be
moot.
The second group draws perhaps an even sharper comparison. These are
heterosexual, female escorts with presumably similar outside employment
opportunities to their female, heterosexual counterparts that do provide sex
to their clients. An important difference, we believe, is that by not providing
sex, these escorts avoid some (if not all) of the stigma, and therefore suffer
less of a reduction in their marriage market value. In Section 4.2 below, we
14In unreported results, we have augmented our the specification to include higher order
power of of both performance and appearance, as well as various interactions between the
two. None of these alter the coefficients on the age coefficients.
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return to this question.
The first column of Table 3 shows the results of the wage regressions for
transsexual escorts that provide sex to their clients. Quite clearly, the hump-
shaped wage pattern observed in the final two columns of Table 2 are absent
here. As shown unconditionally in Figure 1, each successive age category is
associated with a further reduction in hourly wage. Even young transsexuals
(age 21-25) are approximately 10% cheaper than their younger adult (18-20)
counterparts, with increasing wage differences increasing to 16% by age 36-
40, and 22% thereafter. The difference in wage profile is highly significant
from that of female escorts, when all observations are included in the same
regression. The result for the transsexuals is noteworthy also for the level
differences. For the peak ages, 26-30, transsexuals earn only $190/hour,
or about two thirds of the $290/hour for female escorts (Figure 1, lower
panel). This is further suggestive of transsexuals having lower opportunity
cost than female escorts. Since transsexuals are reported as such by reviewers
in our sample, this suggests that the transsexuals provide a window on male
homosexual prostitution. Thus, both the level and the shape of the wage-age
profile of transsexuals are consistent with the hypothesis of EK.
Similar evidence is presented in the second column, which shows the age-
wage profile of female, heterosexual escorts that do not provide sex to their
clients. Figure 1 also shows a steady decline in unconditional wages as age
increases for this group, but when controls are included, no discernible pat-
tern emerges. Similar to the transsexual regression, the (absent) age profile is
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statistically different from the hump-shaped profile in the sex-escort sample,
a pattern consistent with EK.
The final two columns are motivated directly by EK, which suggests a
specific channel through which working as an escort or prostitute may com-
promise a woman’s marriage prospects: stigma. Because men prefer not to
marry prostitutes (current or past), such women have an incentive to lie, and
thereby force their potential husbands to rely on external sources for such
information. It directly follows that when a man can more easily decipher
his potential bride’s experience as a sex worker, she demands compensation
ex-ante for lost future marriage opportunities.
The ideal test of this prediction would be to compare wages between iden-
tical escort groups, save that one works with complete anonymity. Presum-
ably, an important ingredient of such “occupation privacy” is the transience
of an escort’s client base – an escort is certainly more likely to be discovered
if her clients live and work where she does. Unfortunately, we do not have
demographic information on clients that would allow such a test. However,
as a proxy for whether an escort’s clients are local, we distinguish U.S. cities
by their ranking on the 2004 list of ”Top 20 Cities for Convention / Con-
ference/Seminar Travelers,” published by the Travel Industry Association of
America (TIA) and the National Business Travel Association (NBTA). At
the top of the list are cities that, in 2004, hosted the most conferences, and
presumably attracted large numbers of non-local men to the city.15
15See also Cunningham and Kendall [2009b] as examples where large conferences are a
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The list is intuitive – major airline hubs (e.g., Chicago, Washington D.C.,
Atlanta) or cities with particularly seasonable weather (e.g., Orlando, San
Diego) all rank highly. In contrast, several large cities that suffer in either
dimension (e.g., Minneapolis for weather, Seattle for lack of an airline hub)
ranked poorly or failed to make the list.
We split our sample of U.S. cities as close as possible to the median (11,374
observations vs. 13,024), which corresponds to 13th ranked city on the Top
20 list. That is, cities ranked 12th and higher are categorized as cities hosting
“many” conferences, while those ranked 13th and lower we designate “few.”
The results are nearly identical if we include only cities in the Top 20 list
(which account for over 85% of the observations), and spit them by above or
below the median ranking.16
Shown in the third column of Table 3 is the regression among U.S. cities
that are home to many conferences. Considering for a moment only the
controls coefficients (“Agency” and below), we find evidence that the two
markets are quite similar. All coefficients have the same sign except for
“Real Photo” which is insignificantly negative in the third column, and many
have the same statistical significance level. For example, the premium on
appearance is .10 vs. .12 (many vs. few), the overweight discount is -6% vs.
-8%, and the premium for breast implants is 10% vs. 10%. Even the R2 are
similar at 38% and 42% respectively.
proxy for prostitution/escort demand.
16Similarly, if we interact a city’s position in the list by the the relevant age brackets,
the same pattern emerges.
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Despite this similarity in controls, the age profile is significantly different
between the two groups. For the third column which shows only cities home
to many conferences, we see a premium for the 26-30 age group of roughly
4%, falling to -4% by age 40. In the fourth column however, the premium is
over twice as high, peaking at 10% for the the 26-30 group, settling to roughly
the same discount (-4%) for the oldest escort category. Importantly, both re-
gressions include city dummies, leaving only within-city variation to identify
the effects on the remaining covariates, particularly the age brackets.17
The same pattern is observed in the unconditional wages, plotted in the
second panel of Figure 1. Similar to the logarithmic regressions, we observe
a wage hump nearly twice the size in cities where demand is likely to be
local. Such cross-sectional evidence is particularly difficult to reconcile with
alternatives to EK’s marriage market driven stigma explanation of pay in the
prostitution sector.
4.1.2 Alternative hypothesis
An alternative explanation to the hump-shaped age-wage pattern is that es-
corts in their late 20s have pricing power relative to younger escorts. This
conjecture is unsupported by our data. First, our regression analysis controls
for a large number of personal and performance characteristics that may be
associated with pricing power. In particular, each escort is associated with
an extensive set of characteristics including appearance, performance, demo-
17In unreported results, the results are unchanged use interaction terms in an aggregated
sample.
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graphic information, and location. In order for a market power story to hold,
an escort’s age would need to proxy for market power above this extensive set
of control variables, most of which are strongly related to prices. Second, as
evidenced in Figure A.1, clients seem largely unattached to individual escorts
(which may indeed be a selling point of the escort service) – prima facie evi-
dence against an explanation based on market power. Third, we find that the
hump-shaped wage profile is strongest in the most competitive cities (unre-
ported). Finally, the market power story does not predict the cross-sectional
differences we find among transsexual/non-transsexual escorts and those that
provide sexual/non-sexual services.
An alternative explanation to the high level of pay is that escorting is
risky. That escorts are less exposed to risk than street prostitutes does not
imply that escorts are safe. However, we think there are reasons to believe
escorting to be reasonably safe, or at least safe enough to leave a large por-
tion of the $280 +/hour unexplained. First, anecdotal evidence suggest that
condom use is the norm.18 Two larger-scale studies of mortality among pros-
titutes identified by health or policy authorities in the U.K. and the U.S. re-
spectively, concluded that injecting drug use rather than commercial sex was
the main risk factor for contracting HIV-AIDS, Ward et al. [1999], Potterat
et al. [2004]. While these two studies did document much higher mortality
among the studied prostitutes, Ward et al. [1999] noted that poverty, home-
18Personal communication with escorts. High degree of condom use was corroborated
by our email survey, see Section 4.2.
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lessness, drug and alcohol use contribute to violence in their personal and
professional life. Second, the escort business has traditionally been notably
safer than street walking [Biggs, 1988]. Today, the use of modern technology
means that encounters usually leave an electronic trail, adding another layer
of protection.
Still, being alone with strangers at odd hours carry risk. For comparison,
we note that taxi drivers, an occupation similar in those respects, faced a
risk of homicide of 41/100,000 in 1990-92 [Castillo and Jenkins, 1994]. Given
that we have some 40,000 escorts in our data set, 100,000 active escorts in
the U.S. may not be an unreasonable guesstimate. Considering media’s twin
fascination with violence, sex and money, murder cases involving escorts
would likely get media attention. Given that, we find it hard to believe
that more than 41 escorts are murdered each year. With that in mind, we
note that New York taxi drivers in the early 1990s earned about $17/hour
[Camerer et al., 1997], and unlike escorts, they need a license.
4.2 Survey findings
We also conducted a short survey via email (questions with case counts in the
Appendix). We asked four questions with multiple choice answers: Whether
active, and, if not, reasons for quitting; whether work interfered with personal
relationship; and condom use. We were particularly interested in perceived
ability to date or maintain a relationship while working as an escort and the
prevalence of condom use. The former because of EK’s key assumption that
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prostitution interferes with personal life (more so than other occupations);
latter because condoms have been found to offer effective protects against
HIV and other venereal disease – a potentially major occupational hazard.
The response rate was low (107 responses, or about 0.25 percent), and al-
most certainly from a select sample. Nonetheless, the responses corroborate
our impression that escorting can be safe. Condom use appear common. In
fact, near universal at the high end of the market. While survey responses
indicated a less than 100 percent condom use, high degree of provider con-
trol was indicated, suggesting that inability to protect against HIV or other
venereal diseases cannot drive wages. (High degree of provider control is also
consistent with higher prevalence among higher class escorts, who are likely
both wealthier and more health conscious.) Several respondents made the
distinction between vaginal and oral sex, with condom use being common for
the former but not in the latter.
Factors contributing to lower demand for unprotected sex in the U.S.
than has been documented for developing countries may be greater health
awareness of both escort and client and, for the latter, fear of paternity
suits.19
As for whether escorting interfered with dating or ability to maintain long
term relationships, the majority of the respondents said it did. While EK
had stressed male jealousy as the mechanism, several respondents indicated
19Courts favor the needs of the child over private agreements between its parents, Pamela
P. v. Frank S., 59 N.Y.2d 1 (1983).
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general “intimacy fatigue.” A couple of respondents explicitly said they
had quit in order to strengthen their relationship. An (unexpectedly) large
fraction of respondents (37/107) said that they were involved in committed
relationships, but many said that this was done with some difficulty.
The survey question about condom use presumed sex (undefined), and a
handful of escorts wrote back pointing out that they only provide massage,
suggesting the importance of this distinction. Finally, several respondents
emphasized the distinction between street-walkers and escorts.
5 Discussion
We document wages for some 40,000 escorts in the U.S. and Canada using
a web-crawl program. Escorts in our sample earn who provide sex earn
on average $280/hour, which on a full time basis would would place them
somewhere in the top 0.05th percentile of the female earnings distribution.
Moreover, we document a hump-shaped age-wage profile, peaking at ages
26-30, an age bracket that coincides with key family forming years. Both the
level and the shape of the wage profile are strongly suggestive of the marriage
market being an important factor driving opportunity cost for prostitutes, as
suggested by Edlund and Korn [2002]. Importantly, this hump-shaped age-
wage profile is absent for escorts who suffer considerably less damage to their
marriage market prospects – those who do not provide sex and transsexuals
– lending further support to EK. Finally, the hump shape is attenuated for
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escorts who arguably are better placed to conceal a past as a prostitute: those
working in cities with a more transient client base (“convention cities”).
The documented wages are much higher than in other professions, notably
street-prostitution. While the core tasks between street prostitution and
escorting are fundamentally the same, work conditions are much worse in
the former (e.g., liable to prosecution, higher risk of personal violence and
disease). Escorts differ on a number of dimensions from street-prostitutes,
but clearly the wage differential cannot be driven by differences in risk. Of
course, if escorts had extra-ordinary talents or attributes, foregone labor
market opportunities could account for the wage differential. However, they
would truly need to be extraordinary, very few women earn $280 /hour. Both
the number of escorts in our sample and the descriptive statistics suggest the
contrary. Thus, between hazard pay, labor market opportunity cost and
marriage market opportunity cost as an explanation of escort wages, only
the marriage market explanation sustains scrutiny. Unlike street prostitutes,
whose socio-economic characteristics confine them to a marriage market with
few viable propositions, escorts may be quite ordinary, with ordinary women’s
marriage market potential.
To see how the numbers compute, we note that in 2006, the median mar-
ried household with both spouses present had an income of close to $70,000.
Assuming an earnings split of 20/50 between the wife and husband and equal
consumption and savings, this implies an implicit transfer of $15,000 per year
to the wife, or roughly $12,000 thousand after taxes. Integrated over 40 years,
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the net present value (5% discount rate) comes to $216,000. An escort work-
ing 450 hours per year at our average wage of $280 /hour would amortize
that amount in about two years (and have 1,550 hours for non-escort work).
Alternatively, the escort may marry, but less well, for instance, to a husband
who makes $50,000 instead of $80,000. This example was just for illustrative
purposes. Clearly, marriage market returns vary substantially, as can the
ability to sustain work as an escort, we presume.
As for transsexuals, we have interpreted transsexuals as similar to female
escorts who do not provide sex: they provide a different service and do
so at a lower cost. Travelers’ tales and evidence from other animals suggest
another type of transsexual escorts, male impostors. If successful, such males
may obtain gifts intended for female partners in exchange for sex or reap
direct reproductive rewards by obtaining access to harems, e.g., [Trivers,
1985, Chapter 15]. However, in our data, the fact that the reviewer classifies
the escort as a transsexual means that our sample of transsexuals cannot
belong to the second category of impostors.
Finally, we note that the prevalence of pictures on escort and/or agency
websites suggests that the thousand words describing an escorts age, overall
appearance, or even body descriptions may not be sufficient statistics for a
visual impression. Importantly however, pictures only rarely include close-
ups of the escorts face, suggesting a desire to preserve anonymity.
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Appendix
A Simple Search Model with Time-Varying Arrival Rate
of Proposals
Envision a multi-period game in which escorts could marry, but would have to
give up escorting to do so (that is, we maintain the assumption that, at some
level, prostitution and marriage are incompatible). Furthermore, assume
escorts face a finite pool of potential spouses, who randomly propose to them.
If the marriage proposal is accepted, then both the escort and husband exit
their respective pools. Finally, assume that men are heterogeneous with
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respect to, for simplicity, income. Each period, the escort keeps escorting if
her earnings are higher than her best marriage proposal (measured by the
man’s income).
For now, let us assume that escorts are homogenous. It is straightforward
to see that:
1. The higher the income of the proposing man, the higher the opportunity
cost of turning him down.
2. The higher the arrival rate of proposals per time period, the higher the
expected opportunity cost of escorting.
3. The quality of the bachelor pool declines each period, and more so
following high proposal rates.
Now, relaxing the homogeneity assumption, consider the wage an escort
would charge as she progresses through the game.
Let the ages a woman can be active on the marriage and the escort market
coincide and be divided into three periods, where proposal rates are high
in the middle period 2, and low in periods 1 and 3. Unequivocally, the
opportunity cost of escorting in period 3 will be lower than in period 2
because of the lower arrival rate and the lower quality of the bachelor pool.
For period 1, the opportunity cost is lower than in period 2 as long as period
1 proposal rates are sufficiently low. (For high enough period 1 proposal
rates, the expected period 2 proposal values could be lower than period 1’s
because of the deterioration of the bachelor pool).
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Survey
Bellow are the four questions with case counts.
1. Do you still provide escort or companionship services?
a 83 Yes, Im still active.
b 24 No, Im no longer active.
2. If you are no longer active, what led you to change professions? (Indi-
cate any that apply.)
a 7 A relationship.
b 3 Children or other family responsibilities.
c 2 Better or different job.
d 14 Other (please feel free to specify)
3. Did or do your find that your escort or companionship work affects
your love life?
a 26 Yes, I can’t/could’t date much while working.
b 21 Somewhat, although as an escort, you date less.
c 8 No, I still could date as much as I did before.
d 39 Not applicable. I could stay involved in a committed relationship.
4. In your opinion, how common is unsafe sex in the escort market?
33
a 45 No, condoms are always used.
b 37 Very rarely.





Table 1. Summary Statistics by Age 
 
Table 1 presents a number of summary statistics for characteristics, services and pricing of female escorts that provide sex to their clients.  Information is reported 
by clients.  Average Appearance is the mean appearance (scored 1-10 by each client), averaged across all clients that submitted a review about a specific escort. 
 Average Performance is formed in a similar fashion, and is also reported on a 1-10 scale.  Heavy corresponds one of three classifications clients could use to 
describe the escort’s “build,” including “baby fat,” “flabby,” or “heavy.”  Piercings corresponds to having piercings other than on the ears.   Tattoos takes a value of 
one if the client reported the presence of at least one visible tattoo.  Escorts are classified as using an Agency if the client reports using an intermediary to 






Mean Std 50th 10th 90th Mean Std 50th 10th 90th Mean Std 50th 10th 90th Mean Std 50th 10th 90th Mean Std 50th 10th 90th Mean Std 50th 10th 90th
Appearance 7.68 0.96 7.96 6.50 9.00 7.62 0.97 7.75 6.50 9.00 7.51 1.06 7.56 6.00 9.00 7.32 1.08 7.31 6.00 8.67 7.09 1.10 7.00 5.75 8.32 6.80 1.16 7.00 5.00 8.00
Performance 7.19 1.16 7.00 5.80 8.75 7.31 1.15 7.24 6.00 9.00 7.51 1.20 7.66 6.00 9.00 7.64 1.23 8.00 6.00 9.00 7.66 1.24 8.00 6.00 9.00 7.56 1.27 7.87 6.00 9.00
Price 259 115 250 160 350 280 150 250 167 400 298 187 250 167 440 295 185 250 160 400 276 151 250 160 400 255 154 225 150 350
Log Price 5.49 0.33 5.52 5.08 5.86 5.55 0.37 5.52 5.12 5.99 5.60 0.41 5.52 5.12 6.09 5.58 0.43 5.52 5.08 5.99 5.53 0.41 5.52 5.08 5.99 5.44 0.42 5.42 5.01 5.86
Latina Blk White Asn Othr Latina Blk White Asn Othr Latina Blk White Asn Othr Latina Blk White Asn Othr Latina Blk White Asn Othr Latina Blk White Asn Othr
13% 16% 53% 9% 9% 13% 13% 44% 20% 10% 12% 8% 53% 16% 11% 8% 4% 70% 10% 8% 7% 2% 77% 5% 9% 4% 1% 85% 2% 8%
54% 46% 46% 54% 35% 65% 27% 73% 15% 85%
Yes No Yes No
(4,190) (16,576) (8,864) (3,817) (1,696) (1,142)










Yes No Yes No
31%
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Yes No
34% 66%













































93% 7% 90% 10% 88% 12% 89% 11% 89% 11% 90% 10%
No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
46% 54% 42% 58% 39% 61% 37% 63% 69% 27% 73%
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
31% 69% 27% 73% 28% 72% 32% 68% 35% 65% 31%
Yes No Yes No
3% 97% 13% 87% 24% 76% 26% 74% 24% 76% 18% 82%
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Table 2. Female Escorts Providing Sex: Determinants of Wage 
 
Table 2 presents the results of linear regressions of log(hourly wage) as a function of escort characteristics, services, 
and performance.  Column 1 includes only dummy variables corresponding to different age ranges.  The second column 
includes controls for Average appearance and Average performance, and the third column includes city fixed effects 
for every U.S. and Canadian city in our samples.  In the fourth column, we include “attribute” controls beyond Average 
appearance, and augment these with a more intimate set of “activity” controls in the fifth column.  The final column 
shows the results when we restrict our analysis to include only “independent” escorts, who do not work with an Agency. 
 Robust standard errors clustered by city are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels.        
 
  
Dependent Variable: Log(Price per hour) 
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample 
Independents 
Only 
Average Appearance   0.142*** 0.136*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.122*** 
  (0.00261) (0.00248) (0.00223) (0.00248) (0.00341) 
      
Average Performance   0.0235*** 0.0305*** 0.0264*** 0.00769*** 0.00962*** 
  (0.00212) (0.00204) (0.00183) (0.00237) (0.00339) 
      
AGE: 21 - 25 0.0566*** 0.0627*** 0.0412*** 0.0443*** 0.0462*** 0.0583*** 
(0.00585) (0.00563) (0.00541) (0.00561) (0.00511) (0.00746) 
      
AGE: 26 - 30 0.102*** 0.119*** 0.0969*** 0.0691*** 0.0681*** 0.0798*** 
(0.00671) (0.00636) (0.00610) (0.00625) (0.00585) (0.00834) 
      
AGE: 31 - 35 0.0844*** 0.126*** 0.114*** 0.0562*** 0.0539*** 0.0536*** 
(0.00857) (0.00795) (0.00763) (0.00756) (0.00735) (0.00974) 
      
AGE: 36 - 40 0.0385*** 0.111*** 0.0954*** 0.0223** 0.0218** 0.0182 
(0.0111) (0.0103) (0.0100) (0.00965) (0.00967) (0.0117) 
      
AGE: Over 40 -0.0545*** 0.0623*** 0.0493*** -0.0291*** -0.0220* -0.0148 
(0.0133) (0.0122) (0.0118) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0134) 
      
Agency     0.0252*** 0.0341*** 
    (0.00372) (0.00371) 
      
Smoking     -0.0433*** -0.0479*** -0.0550*** 
    (0.00384) (0.00378) (0.00527) 
      
Real Photo     0.0139** 0.0157*** 0.00981 
    (0.00566) (0.00560) (0.00870) 
      
Heavy     -0.0600*** -0.0613*** -0.0676*** 
    (0.00522) (0.00516) (0.00656) 
      
Breast Size: C to D     0.00340 0.00413 0.00684 
    (0.00388) (0.00364) (0.00530) 
      
Breast Size: DD+     0.0294*** 0.0254*** 0.0165** 
    (0.00648) (0.00683) (0.00833) 
      
Breast Implants     0.109*** 0.108*** 0.112*** 
    (0.00504) (0.00525) (0.00708) 
      
Piercings     -0.00584* -0.00802** -0.0176*** 
    (0.00348) (0.00341) (0.00472) 
      
Tattoos     -0.0100*** -0.0144*** -0.0238*** 
    (0.00361) (0.00355) (0.00482) 
      
City Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Attribute Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Activity Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Observations 36278 36278 36278 36278 36268 19121 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.182 0.251 0.335 0.373 0.387 




Table 3. Age/Wage Profile Among Control Groups 
 
Table 3 shows linear regressions of log(hourly wage) for two comparison samples: Transexuals (born males) in the first 
column, and female escorts that do not provide sex to their clients (No Sex).  The third and fourth column shows the 
results of wage regressions for sample of female escorts providing sex to their clients (final columns of Table 2), broken 
down by the number of conferences hosted by the city.  This list was obtained from the National Business Travel 
Association’s (NBTA) 2004 survey, “Business and Convention Travelers Report.”  Robust standard errors clustered by 
city are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.        
 
  
Dependent Variable: Log(Price per hour) 
Transsexuals No Sex 
Cities with  
Many Conferences 
Cities with  
Few Conferences 
Average Appearance 0.0604*** 0.0820*** 0.105*** 0.123*** 
(0.0100) (0.00583) (0.00439) (0.00452) 
    
Average Performance 0.0101 -0.0141** 0.00234 0.0165*** 
(0.0112) (0.00677) (0.00440) (0.00426) 
    
AGE: 21 - 25 -0.0913** 0.0127 0.0303*** 0.0652*** 
(0.0428) (0.0221) (0.00911) (0.0101) 
    
AGE: 26 - 30 -0.116*** 0.00193 0.0402*** 0.0999*** 
(0.0438) (0.0227) (0.0105) (0.0111) 
    
AGE: 31 - 35 -0.126** -0.00773 0.0273** 0.0782*** 
(0.0533) (0.0248) (0.0124) (0.0140) 
    
AGE: 36 - 40 -0.159** -0.0229 0.00641 0.0344* 
(0.0631) (0.0275) (0.0159) (0.0195) 
    
AGE: Over 40 -0.217** -0.0188 -0.0402* -0.0357* 
(0.0977) (0.0294) (0.0213) (0.0199) 
    
Agency 0.00361 0.0124 0.0762*** 0.0352*** 
(0.0261) (0.0105) (0.00662) (0.00667) 
    
Smoking -0.0194 -0.0118 -0.0434*** -0.0647*** 
(0.0192) (0.0134) (0.00703) (0.00670) 
    
Real Photo -0.0396 0.192*** -0.0123 0.0235*** 
(0.0395) (0.0132) (0.0112) (0.00886) 
    
Heavy -0.0293 -0.00647 -0.0607*** -0.0814*** 
(0.0251) (0.0139) (0.00928) (0.00939) 
    
Breast Size: C to D 0.104*** 0.00355 0.000344 0.00380 
(0.0220) (0.0103) (0.00667) (0.00642) 
    
Breast Size: DD+ 0.137*** 0.0157 -0.000204 0.0458*** 
(0.0345) (0.0183) (0.0117) (0.0120) 
    
Breast Implants 0.0200 0.0658*** 0.0997*** 0.103*** 
(0.0206) (0.0163) (0.00913) (0.00899) 
    
Piercings -0.0378** -0.0191** -0.00317 -0.00606 
(0.0165) (0.00968) (0.00608) (0.00615) 
    
Tattoos 0.00998 0.0101 -0.0208*** -0.0117* 
(0.0172) (0.0106) (0.00640) (0.00650) 
    
City Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Attribute Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Activity Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1509 6250 11374 13024 
Adjusted R2 0.210 0.412 0.375 0.424 




Figure 1. Age/Wage Profiles 
 
The top figure plots the mean hourly wage  by age group among three groups: escorts who provide sex to their clients, 
escorts who do not (e.g. massage only) and escorts who are transsexuals.  The bottom figure plots the mean hourly 
wage among escorts who have sex but are located in cities with many (few) conferences.  Conference cities are taken 
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Figure  A.1 Client Preferences 
 
The top figure plots the distribution of reviews by reviewer/client type.  Reviewer type is determined by the total 
number of reviews we observe given by each client.  The bottom figure plots conditional probabilities for reviewers that 
review more than one escort.  Given the age of the current escort reviewed, it plots the probability of observing escorts 
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Age of Escort 18 - 20 21 - 25 26 - 30 31 - 35 36 - 40 41 - 45 Over 45
18 - 20 16.3% 43.7% 23.4% 9.3% 4.5% 2.0% 0.7%
21 - 25 9.1% 44.5% 27.2% 10.8% 5.0% 2.3% 1.0%
26 - 30 6.6% 36.4% 30.4% 14.5% 7.0% 3.4% 1.6%
31 - 35 5.4% 29.6% 29.2% 18.0% 9.8% 5.5% 2.5%
36 - 40 4.6% 25.9% 27.2% 18.3% 13.0% 7.3% 3.8%
41 - 45 4.1% 22.6% 25.0% 18.7% 14.1% 9.7% 5.8%
Over 45 3.4% 19.3% 23.1% 18.6% 15.7% 12.0% 8.0%
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